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I ARTICLESI
The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing
Substantial Similarity Down to Earth
Laura G. Lape*
I. Introduction
"Thou shalt not steal."' Thus begins and ends the court's
reasoning in its determination of copyright infringement in a recent case
involving the digital sampling into a rap song of three words and "a
portion of the music" from a prior recording.2 Granted, thou shalt not
*Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. Copyright 1994, Laura G. Lape. I
wish to thank my research assistant, Cindy Monaco, for her invaluable assistance.
1. Exodus 20:15.
2. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). "'Thou shalt not steal' has been an admonition followed since the dawn of
civilization. Unfortunately, in the modem world of business this admonition is not always followed
.... The conduct of the defendants herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment,
but also the copyright laws of this country." Id. The foregoing, together with the statement that
the defendants admit using three words and "a portion of the music" from plaintiff's recording, and
the statement that "the defendants knew that they were violating the plaintiffs rights" comprise the
entirety of the court's reasoning on the issue of copyright infringement. See id. at 183, 185. The
admission of use merely establishes actual copying, though not necessarily copying of expression
or satisfaction of the standard for infringement. The defendant's belief (or perhaps merely fear) that
it was infringing does not mean that it was, in fact, infringing. Predicting the result in copyright
cases is well-nigh impossible and ignorance regarding copyright law is rampant, even among those
most affected by that law. See, e.g., John Gastineau, Bent Fish: Issues of Ownership and
Infringement in Digitally Processed Images, 67 IND. L.J. 95, 120 (1991) ("'ad hoc' nature of
decisions about substantial similarity leads to widely divergent results in photography cases");
Michael Wurzer, Infringement of the Exclusive Right to Prepare Derivative Works: Reducing
Uncertainty, 73 MINN. L. REv. 1521, 1521, 1535, 1539 (1989) (substantial similarity requirement
"provides copyright owners no predictability regarding the scope of protection, especially in cases
involving computer software"); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The
Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. ANN. 349, 350 (1988) ("no
reliable way to predict an answer" to the question of infringement); Jessica Litman, Copyright as
Myth, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 235, 240-42 (1991) (public conception of copyright law differs greatly
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1993
steal. But what is stealing? Unlike obscenity, copyright infringement
cannot be recognized just by looking at it.3  Nevertheless, courts in
effect commonly take the "I know it when I see it" approach when
deciding copyright infringement cases. As a result, substantial similarity
and resulting infringement are found without reference to any standard
to give substantial similarity meaning and without regard to the impact
of the defendant's activities on the plaintiff. The effect is over-protection
of copyright, with consequent unnecessary stifling of creativity.
Part V of this Article examines this problem and suggests that
substantial similarity be defined as substantial harm to the plaintiff, such
harm being broadly conceived. Other infringement issues are touched
on briefly in Part II. Part III reviews the early development of the
substantial similarity standard. Part IV deals with the interaction of
infringement and fair use determinations.
II. Analytical Framework and Other Copyright Issues
Currently there are a number of problematic infringement issues
other than that which is the focus of this Article. These areas of
difficulty or contention are set forth briefly here in order to clarify my
topic, by excluding what is not within its scope.
The groundwork for setting forth these problems is the following
analysis of what a finding of copyright infringement must, at a minimum,
entail. Before a court can find infringement, the court must first find
that the defendant did, in fact, copy the plaintiff's work. It is a hoary
truism of copyright law that without the act of copying there is no
infringement.' Second, there must be a determination that the
defendant's copying was in some way sufficient for liability;5 otherwise,
copying the first word of this Article, for instance, would be copyright
infringement.
from actual copyright law; "the authors the statute affects are scarcely more expert than the general
population").
3. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("But I know
[obscenity] when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.").
4. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("Absent copying there can be no
infringement of copyright.").
5. This framework for an infringement cause of action was used by Judge Frank in setting
forth the Second Circuit's two-step test for infringement in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468
(2d Cir. 1946). "[It is important to avoid confusing two separate elements essential to a plaintiffs
case in [a copyright infringement action]: (a) that defendant copied from plaintiff's copyrighted
work and (b) that the copying (assuming it to be proved) went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation." Id. Courts have embroidered these two elements in a variety of ways, see infra
notes 6-12 and accompanying text, but a finding of infringement consistent with elementary
copyright principles must at a minimum include these two elements.
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
Many current copyright infringement decisions fail to distinguish
actual copying from the value judgment that the copying was in some
way bad enough to warrant liability. The decisions may address only
one issue or the other, or recite that copyright infringement can be
established by showing access and substantial similarity without explicitly
connecting access and substantial similarity to actual copying or the value
judgment that the copying warrants liability.6 Another crux related to
these confused infringement analyses is the approach of the Ninth Circuit
first set forth in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp.,' which, as subsequently modified in Shaw v.
Lindheim,8 requires "objective" and "subjective" analyses of similarity
of expression, and does not deal explicitly with actual copying.'
Another source of contention and confusion in current copyright
infringement cases is the difficulty experienced by courts in
distinguishing between idea and expression. 0 This difficulty has been
6. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990)
(omitting value judgment issue and stating that substantial similarity is not required); Business
Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 402-403 (2d Cir. 1989) (addressing
only actual copying); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 207-209 (9th Cir. 1988)
(using access and substantial similarity without relating them to issues of actual copying and value
judgment); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-99 (2d Cir. 1983)
(failing to tie access and substantial similarity explicitly to actual copying and value judgment); Alan
Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188-1204 (1990) (noting courts' confusion in using
substantial similarity to establish both actual copying and infringing copying); Shira Perlmutter, The
Scope of Copyright in Telephone Directories: Keeping Listing Information in the Public Domain, 38
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 1, 4-6 (1990) (criticizing courts for failing to subdivide infringing
copying into copying and substantial similarity). The Seventh Circuit created a jumbled analysis in
Atari v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (1982), by stating that
copying is shown by access and substantial similarity, and that then substantial similarity is split into
actual copying and improper appropriation. Id. at 614. The Second Circuit has recently stated that
"there seems little harm in combining the copying and infringement inquiries, as we have done in
the past." Twin Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 n. 1 (2d
Cir. 1993).
7. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring determination of substantial similarity of
ideas and substantial similarity of expression).
8. 908 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that "the two tests are more sensibly described
as objective and subjective analyses of expression"). See also Brown Bag Software v. Symantec
Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (following Shaw). The Ninth Circuit's approach in
Krofft and Shaw has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Jamie Busching, Shaw v. Lindheim: The
Ninth Circuit's Attempt to Equalize the Odds in Copyright Infringement, 11 LOY. ENT. L.J. 67, 83-
85 (1991) (criticizing failure to distinguish between the use of substantial similarity to prove actual
copying and to establish infringing copying). See generally Steven Knowles & Ronald J. Palmieri,
Dissecting Kroffi: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 109 (1980).
9. Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d at 535.
10. Such a distinction is necessary because it is a basic tenet of copyright law that copyright
protects expression but not ideas. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("protection
is given only to the expression of the idea - not the idea itself") (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S.
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particularly acute in the context of computer programs, where courts
have struggled with the determination whether the programs' structure
constitutes idea or expression." A problem related, but not identical,
to the difficulty of distinguishing idea from expression is the method for
determining substantial similarity developed largely by the Ninth Circuit.
This approach, in its original form, eschews distinguishing between idea
and expression in favor of examining whether the "total concept and
feel" or "look and feel" of the works is substantially similar.'2
99 (1879)); 17 U.S.C. 102(b) (1988). In an infringement action the court must determine whether
defendant has taken protectible expression or only unprotectible ideas. The line between idea and
expression is notoriously difficult to draw. See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d
131, 141 (1992) ("[N]o principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the
'idea' and has borrowed its 'expression.'" (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,
274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960))); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1930) (L. Hand, J.) ("Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary [between idea and
expression], and nobody ever can.").
11. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that "compared to aesthetic works, computer programs hover even more closely to the
elusive boundary line ' between idea and expression, and holding that "those elements of a computer
program that are necessarily incidental to its function are ... unprotectable"); Whelan Assocs., Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that "the purpose
or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everthing that is not necessary to that
purpose or function would be part of the expression" and that "copyright protection of computer
programs may extend ... to the [program's] structure, sequence and organization");
CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (rejecting Third
Circuit approach and adopting Second Circuit approach); John F. Homick, Computer Program
Copyrights: Look and Feel No Evil, 5 SoFrwARE L.J. 355, 355-57, 370-71, 382-83 (1992) (stating
that "[tihe law of copyrightability of computer programs currently is a morass"); David Nimmer,
Richard L. Bernacchi & Gary N. Frischling, A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial
Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 629-634
(1988) (criticizing courts' approaches to distinguishing idea and expression in computer programs).
Distinguishing idea from expression may pose particular difficulty in determining infringement
of factual compilations. The Supreme Court's clarification in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1297 (1991), that effort may not be substituted for original expression,
requires courts to draw what may be a difficult line.
12. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 823 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating
that under the "total concept and feel" test, it is not necessary to determine the scope of copyright
protection). The total concept and feel approach has been used by the Ninth Circuit to determine
substantial similarity of expression in the second step of its two-step analysis. See supra notes 7-9
and accompanying text. See also Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp.,
672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that dissection of work into copyrighted and unprotected
elements is generally rejected in favor of examining the "total concept and feel" of work); Roth
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding substantial
similiarity where the "total concept and feel" of defendant's cards are the same as plaintiff's cards);
cf. Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiff cannot
rely on unprotectible elements to establish substantial similarity and affirming finding that "apart
from these non-protectible elements" the "total concept and feel" of works is different). But cf. 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[AI[1][c] (1990)
(criticizing total concept and feel approach on grounds, inter alia, that it risks protecting ideas);
Pamela Hobbs, Methods of Determining Substantial Similarity in Copyright Cases Involving
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
None of these topics, relevant as they all are to the disarray in
current copyright infringement analysis, is the subject of this Article.
Rather, the problem addressed here is the lack of any substance to the
concept of substantial similarity as used to make the value judgment
whether the defendant's copying warrants liability. We turn first to the
history of the substantial similarity standard.
III. Early Development of Substantial Similarity Standard
The following discussion addresses the origin of the substantial
similarity standard as used to determine improper appropriation, that is,
whether the defendant's copying amounts to infringement. 3  An
examination of nineteenth century cases reveals that the standard for
improper appropriation was then in the process of being formulated. The
nineteenth century courts were concerned with whether defendants had
taken something of value, but this concept was not carried to the logical
conclusion of requiring that plaintiffs prove they had suffered harm.
In nineteenth century infringement cases the determination of
improper appropriation was blended with the determination of actual
copying, as well as with the determination of fair use.'4 Nineteenth
century decisions show nothing even approaching a neat division of the
analysis of liability into these sub-issues."5 For example, in Blume v.
Computer Programs, 67 U. DET. L. REV. 393, 404-407, 411 (1990) (stating that application of
"total concept and feel" approach broadens protection for computer programs); Alfred C. Yen, A
First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total
Concept and Feel, " 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 397, 420-33 (1989) (arguing that "total concept and feel"
approach has chilling effect on protected speech).
13. The determination that defendant's copying amounts to infringement was termed a finding
of improper appropriation by the Second Circuit in the leading case of Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 468 (1946). The term "improper appropriation" will be used in this discussion.
14. Nineteenth century cases sometimes used the term "fair use" to mean any non-infringing
use, rather than a privilege to make an otherwise infringing use. See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75
F. 6, 8 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (using term "fair use" to mean consultation of earlier work by author
of later work who did her own "independent study, research, and labor"). In this Article, the term
"fair use" will be used as it is used in § 107 of the current act, unless otherwise indicated. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
15. See, e.g., Colliery Engineer Co. v. United Correspondence Schools Co., 94 F. 152, 153
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899) (drawing no distinction between actual copying and improper appropriation);
Falk v. Brett Lithographing Co., 48 F. 678, 679 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891) (drawing no distinction
between actual copying and improper appropriation); Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519, 520
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (blending fair use and infringement); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1137-
38 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552) (drawing no distinction between actual copying and improper
appropriation, blending fair use and infringement); Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116-17
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4095) (drawing no distinction between actual copying and improper
appropriation); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) (blending
fair use and infringement). But see Cohen, supra note 2, at 354 (nineteenth century courts "focused
on three separate issues").
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Spear, 6 a late nineteenth century case dealing with infringement of a
musical composition, no distinction was drawn between actual copying
and improper appropriation. Consider the court's discussion of
infringement, reproduced here in its entirety:
Upon the question of infringement there is not much room
for doubt. The theme or melody of the music is
substantially the same in the copyrighted and the alleged
infringing pieces. The measure of the former is followed
in the latter, and is somewhat peculiar. When played by
a competent musician, they appear to be really the same.
There are variations, but they are so placed as to indicate
that the former was taken deliberately, rather than that the
latter was a new piece. 7
The second sentence of the above discussion appears to deal with degree
of copying or improper appropriation. The following sentence, pointing
out the peculiarity of the measure, supports an inference of actual
copying based on the improbability of two musicians independently
creating the same piece of music. The next sentence, addressing the
impression of the two pieces as played, seems to bear on the issue of
improper appropriation. In the final sentence the court relies on artful
variations to infer actual copying.
Similarly, Justice Story's discussion of the standard for infringement
in the opening paragraph of Folsom v. Marsh'8 blends improper
appropriation ("the nature, extent and value of the materials thus used"),
actual copying ("the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed
to have resorted to the same common sources of information"), and fair
use ("reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his
design be really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and
reasonable criticism"). 9  Thus, the attempt to ascertain nineteenth
century standards for improper appropriation is fraught with difficulty.
Turning to nineteenth century discussions of infringement, we see
that the courts groped for a term to define the standard of improper
appropriation. In various decisions the courts used such language as "a
substantial copy" or "substantial identity";' "all that is substantial and
material" or "conveying substantially the same impressions"; 2' "legally
16. 30F. 629 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
17. Id. at 631.
18. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
19. Id. at 344.
20. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 622 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (Story, J.).
21. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1137, 1138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
identical" or borrowing "its essential characteristics"; 2' "substantial
infringement" or appropriation of "any material part";' and "illegal
appropriation of the substantial parts."24 The precise term "substantial
similarity" first appeared in early twentieth century cases.'
Curiously, many nineteenth century decisions indicate in their
definition of improper appropriation that something of value must have
been taken by the defendant; the discussions are peppered with the
words, "value," "material," and "meritorious." 26 However, the issue
of injury to the plaintiff was, for the most part, confined to the
determination whether the use was fair; injury to the plaintiff was used
to distinguish between noninfringing criticism (which would today be
termed fair use) and superseding copying.' For instance, Justice Story
explained in Gray v. Russelfl8 that the issue of "piracy" may depend on
whether defendant's work is "bona fide" criticism or abridgement, on the
one hand, or a superseding work in the marketplace, on the other.29
One case even indicated that injury to the plaintiff, both actual and
potential, was relevant to the question of damages or remedy, but not to
the issue of infringement.30 The Circuit Court for the Southern District
of New York stated in a case finding infringement of a photograph:3'
22. Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4095).
23. Gilmore v. Anderson, 38 F. 846, 848, 849 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889).
24. Falkv. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 35 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
25. See, e.g., Chautauqua School of Nursing v. Nat'l School of Nursing, 211 F. 1014, 1015
(W.D.N.Y. 1914); Dam v. Kirke La Shelle Co., 166 F. 589, 591 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
26. See, e.g., Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 35 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) ("quality and value,"
"substantial and material part"); Gilmore v. Anderson, 38 F. 846, 848 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) ("any
material part"); Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1137 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552) ("the
whole meritorious part"); Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No.
5763) ("value of the original"); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 624 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
4436) (Story, J.) ("important and valuable portion"); cf. Cohen, supra note 2, at 357 (stating that
term "substantial" in nineteenth century cases "referred to the economic or aesthetic significance of
what the defendant had copied").
27. See, e.g., Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519, 520 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886) (deciding whether
extracts are "fair exposition or reasonable criticism" or whether they "supersede the original");
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (stating that if defendant's
work does not contain extracts, but supersedes, plaintiff's copyright is infringed). Note that § 107
of the Copyright Act of 1976 codified the courts' use of market impact to help determine fair use.
107 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). "In determining whether the use made of a work ... is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include . (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work." Id.
28. 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728).
29. Id. at 1038.
30. Falkv. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 36 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
31. Id.
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Defendants claim that the value of [plaintiffs] photograph has not
been impaired by the publication of [defendants'] lithograph, and
there is no infringement, because the photograph and lithograph are
not rivals, and are not in competition in any way. This fact does not
affect the question of infringement, but only the measure of
damages.
32
Thus, although many early decisions state that the standard for improper
appropriation involves taking something of value, plaintiffs were not
required to show injury in order to win infringement actions.
IV. Interaction of Infringement and Fair Use
The impact of the fair use defense on courts' consideration of
copyright infringement must now be addressed. The determination of
infringement receives short shrift in many decisions in which the
defendant has raised the affirmative defense of fair use. 33  As an
affirmative defense, fair use relieves the defendant of liability where
infringement has otherwise been found.' However, courts frequently
either omit or give cursory treatment to the issue of infringement when
the fair use defense is raised.
This omission or scant treatment of the infringement issue may be
due to the procedural posture of the case. For example, the court may
find fair use and choose not to reach the issue of infringement, since
there can be no liability in any event,35 or the defendant may concede
the issue of infringement.36 Problematical, however, are other cases
where the court skips or glosses over the finding of infringement and
32. Id.
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
34. Section 107 provides that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A
[which set forth exclusive rights], the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of
copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). See also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 at 13-64 (1990) (stating that term "fair use" was usually used in
pre-1978 cases and is used in § 107 of current act for a defense that applies "not because of the
absence of substantial similarity but rather despite the fact that the similarity is substantial").
35. See, e.g., Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(dismissing complaint based in the alternative on finding of fair use and omitting infringement
analysis); D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 141, 146-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(granting summary judgment to defendants on copyright infringement based on finding of fair use
and omitting infringement analysis).
36. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)
(omitting infringement analysis where "respondents [do not] dispute that verbatim copying of.
excerpts ... would constitute infringement unless excused as fair use"); Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1173 (5th Cir. 1980) (omitting infringement
analysis because undisputed that defendant-appellee's use of work was infringement unless protected
by fair use or First Amendment).
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where fair use is not found. The result is liability although the court
never thoughtfully considered the issue of infringement. For instance,
in New Era Publications, Int'l v. Carol Publishing Group,3" in which
fair use was not found, the trial court's entire discussion of infringement
was limited to the following: "The book takes many passages from
copyrighted sources. It infringes New Era's copyright unless copying
the passages is a fair use."38 Similarly, the trial court in Triangle
Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 39 stated that the
section 106 display right' was implicated by defendant's display of the
cover of T.V. Guide, but the court performed no infringement analysis
before finding against fair use.4 A similar recitation of the copyright
owner's exclusive rights under section 106 constituted the Southern
District of New York's sole treatment of the infringement issue prior to
finding fair use in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.42 On appeal Judge
Van Graafeiland of the Second Circuit impliedly criticized the court for
not looking closer at the infringement issue since the amount of
protectible material taken by defendant "was so minimal that the subject
of fair use need not be reached." 3  Failure to make an initial
determination of infringement is even more troubling in cases, such as
those discussed above, where the fair use defense is rejected.
Why is it that courts often cut comers on the infringement analysis
in fair use cases? It appears that courts may do so because both analyses
involve determining the substantiality of what has been taken." This
overlap has been noted, and criticized, by some scholars,45 one of
37. 729 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (finding fair use), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990).
38. Id. at 995.
39. 445F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), aff'd on othergrounds, 626F.2d 1171 (5thCir. 1980).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1988). "[Tlhe owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive right[s]
.... to display the copyrighted work publicly." Id.
41. Triangle Publications, Inc., 445 F. Supp. at 879-8 1.
42. 748 F. Supp. 105, 108-114 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aft'd, 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
43. Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 743 (2d Cir. 1991) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
concurring). "The defense of fair use assumes the existence of infringement." Id.
44. Section 107 provides that in determining fair use, "the factors to be considered shall
include .... (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
The failure to deal adequately with the initial determination of infringement in fair use cases
may also stem from the development of these doctrines in the nineteenth century, when they were
not treated as discrete doctrines. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 376 (stating that consideration of extent of similarities
to determine both substantial similarity and fair use "unnecessarily duplicates the evidence and
unduly confuses the analysis of similarities"). A related, but not identical, criticism is that the fourth
factor considered under § 107 in determining fair use - "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work" - unnecessarily duplicates the inquiry into market
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whom has suggested eliminating the determination of improper
appropriation and requiring that the plaintiff establish only actual
copying of some expression before the defendant must prove fair use to
avoid liability.47 This approach appears unfair in that it would place the
burden of proof on the defendant before the plaintiff has established any
injury.8 Further, this approach could result in liability where none
should be imposed, as where the defendant has copied expression without
substantial harm to the plaintiff, but cannot establish one of the
traditional fair use uses under section 107(1). 49 This concern is all the
more realistic since at least some judges view satisfaction of section
107(1) as necessary to a successful fair use defense.5" It is no support
for the suggested approach that it approximates what many courts are
now in fact doing. We need a means for determining, first whether
liability should be imposed under the standard for infringement, and
second whether, due to the unusual societal benefits of the defendant's
use, the infringement should be excused. It appears, then, that a place
remains in copyright law both for substantial similarity in the
infringement analysis and for the doctrine of fair use.
V. The Substantial Similarity Standard
A. Absence of a Meaningful Test
A second toy manufacturer produces a stuffed monkey that
resembles that of another manufacturer; a computer program designed to
run a video game and the audiovisual display it produces are like those
of a prior game; a digital sampler uses two notes of drum beats from a
prior recording of reggae music in her rock recording. If done without
effects which would be made if impact on audience purchasing decisions were the basis for finding
substantial similarity. See Michael F. Sitzer, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for
Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 395 (1981).
46. For an explanation of the use of the term "improper appropriation," see supra note 13.
47. Cohen, supra note 2, at 390-91. For another proposal that the infringement and fair use
analyses be combined, see Leo J. Raskind, The Continuing Process of Refining and Adapting
Copyright Principles, 14 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 125, 127 (1990).
48. On the advisability of requiring proof of injury, see infra Part V.
49. Section 107(1) provides that in determining whether a given use is fair use, the court
should consider "the purpose and character of the use," such as whether the use is for "nonprofit
educational purposes," "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship, or research."
17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
50. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116
(1990) ("Factor One is the soul of fair use. A finding of justification under this factor seems
indispensable to a fair use defense."). Judge Leval has recently been elevated from the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
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the permission of the copyright owner of the prior work in each case,
and assuming in each case a finding of actual copying, have the toy
manufacturer, the video game producer and the digital sampler infringed
the copyrights? Surprisingly, infringement is usually determined "ad
hoc," by asking whether the two works are substantially similar, and by
simply responding yes or no. The most serious problem with the
infringement analysis in copyright cases is that the crucial determination
of substantial similarity is performed without giving any real-life
significance to the term substantial similarity.5 In the case of the
monkey, are similar eyes, the same color, and identical tails enough? Is
5% of the computer program, or 20% or 30% enough? Are two notes
of drum beats taken from a 7 minute reggae song enough? These
decisions, oddly enough, are usually made by courts52 without any
standard to give the term substantial similarity meaning.
Although at least one commentator has criticized the absence of a
meaningful standard,53 the courts seem content with the situation,
applying the test as they understand it. Occasionally, an opinion will
note the amorphousness of substantial similarity.' Courts regularly
recite one or more of several formulations which are supposed to help
the court determine the issue of substantial similarity. For example, in
51. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 939-40 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming
finding of substantial similarity and infringement); ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,
722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming finding of substantial similarity and infringement);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 828-30 (11th Cir. 1982)
(affirming finding of substantial similarity and infringement); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
America, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1935, 1938-39 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (granting preliminary injunction
based on finding likelihood of success on merits of substantial similarity and infringement); In
Design, Inc. v. Lauren Knitwear Corp., 782 F. Supp. 824, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding substantial
similarity and infringement); Cofre, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1546, 1546-49)
(granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment based on finding of substantial similarity and
infringement).
In this discussion the determination of substantial similarity is the finding made in order to
determine improper appropriation, see supra note 13, rather than that made to support an inference
of actual copying.
52. In copyright infringement actions, the trier of fact is generally a judge. See, e.g., Paul W.
Orth, The Use of Expert Witnesses in Musical Infringement Cases, 16 U. PIrrT. L. REv. 232, 255
(1955) (stating that "in practically all cases an injunction is sought, so that the average ear is that
of a judge who may well supply more sophistication than he talks about").
53. Cohen, supra note 2, at 371 (stating that there is no objective framework for defining how
much copying is too much).
54. See, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 139 (D.N.J.
1982) (stating that "the test for infringement necessarily [is] vague and seemingly arbitrary");
Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that
"'substantial similarity' is an elusive concept"); L & L White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387
F. Supp. 1349, 1352-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that substantial similarity is an "'ad hoc'
determination" which "cannot be subjected to mathematical determination").
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a recent case dealing with the alleged copyright infringement of concrete
lawn ornaments, the First Circuit recited three frequently used
formulations:"
1) "The test is whether the accused work is so similar to the
plaintiff's work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude
that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff's protectible
expression by taking material of substance and value" ;16
2) [T]wo works are substantially similar if "the ordinary observer,
unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to
overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same; S7 and
3) The test is "whether an average lay observer would recognize the
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted
work. "1s
These formulas offer little help. The first formula seems to say that
works are substantially similar if the ordinary person would think that
there has been copyright infringement. This formula is thus a tautology.
The second formula appears to say both too much and too little. Should
infringement be found only where the ordinary person would think the
works were just the same, unless he were hunting for differences?
Should infringement be found based on common "aesthetic appeal"
alone? The third formula would authorize a finding of infringement
whenever anything recognizable from the plaintiff's work appeared in the
defendant's. Surely this is too trivial a basis for imposing liability.
Consider Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California,9 a recent
Second Circuit decision dealing with two floral fabric designs.
Defendant showed a swatch of plaintiff's rose-decorated fabric to the
designer that subsequently developed defendant's rose-decorated
fabric.' The court noted that although in both cases the roses were
placed on the background in the same straight line pattern, defendant's
rose was in soft focus, whereas plaintiff's rose had a sharper image.6'
If there were actual copying, the court concluded, the roses were not
55. Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1988).
56. Id. at 607 (quoting Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 541 (3d Cir.
1986)).
57. Id. (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960)).
58. Id. (quoting Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966)).
59. 937F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991).
60. Id. at 762.
61. Id. at 766.
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substantially similar and therefore there was no infringement.62 How
did the court know the roses were not substantially similar? How alike
would they have to be to justify a finding of infringement? The court
provided no answers to these questions .63
Some courts have attempted to quantify substantial similarity by
focusing on the percentage of the plaintiffs work which is like the
defendant's work.' The weakness of this approach, as noted by some
courts, is that it ignores the qualitative importance to the plaintiffs work
of the similar elements.' If the quantity of copied material alone is
considered, then digital sampling, for example, would almost never be
infringement.' Consideration of the quality of copied material does
not, however, solve the problem; both quantity and quality are
meaningless unless they are expressly related to some impact of the
alleged infringing work on the plaintiff.
An example of reliance on quantity is the Ninth Circuit's analysis
of substantial similarity in Worth v. Selchow & Righter Company.67 In
Worth, the plaintiff alleged infringement of two trivia books by the
game, Trivial Pursuit.' The court found that the selection of facts in
62. Id.
63. Similarly, in performing fair use analyses under § 107, courts generally do not tie their
evaluation of the third factor - "the amount and substantiality of the portion used" - to either the
fourth factor - "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of" the work - or to
any other impact on the plaintiff. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Thus, the third factor is usually
treated in fair use determinations as having significance independent of any effect on the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1078 (2d Cir. 1992); Educational Testing
Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 543 (3d Cir. 1986); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority,
Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1986); Pacific & Southern Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490,
1497 (11 th Cir. 1984); Iowa State University Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
Inc., 621 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d
1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993) ("[The fact that a substantial
portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim is evidence of the qualitative value of the copied
material, both to the originator and to the plagiarist who seeks to profit from marketing someone
else's copyrighted expression." (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 565 (1985))).
64. See, e.g., Kregos v. Associated Press, 795 F. Supp. 1325, 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding
fifty percent similarity is not substantial similarity); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 220
U.S.P.Q. 170, 176 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (finding copying of forty percent of plaintiffs work to be
infringement).
65. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (even if copied portion is small
in relation to whole work, if qualitatively important, the finder of fact may find substantial
similarity); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1245 (3d Cir. 1986)
(regarding many works "the court must make a qualitative, not quantitative, judgment about...
the importance of the substantially similar portions of the work").
66. Perhaps digital sampling should not be infringement, but surely not on such grounds.
67. 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987).
68. Id.
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the books and game was not substantially similar because there had been
no "bodily appropriation" of plaintiff's selection; only 3,976 out of the
12,000 facts in plaintiff's books had been used by defendant.69 The
outcome in this case may have been correct, but the opinion fails to
explain why. Why should borrowing one-third of the selection not lead
to liability? Being told that defendant copied a certain percentage of
plaintiff's work or one very important passage, for example, does not
explain why defendant's act should constitute infringement.
B. Requirement of Harm
How then should substantial similarity, and therefore infringement,
be determined? The issue should be whether the plaintiff has suffered
any harm.7" There are two arguments for requiring a finding of harm
69. Id. at 573 & n.6. Aside from the issue of infringement of plaintiff's selection, the court
found merger in defendant's use of plaintiffs words and no copying of the arrangement of facts.
Id. at 573. The court stated in a footnote that the "qualitative importance of the material to the
plaintiff's work is more significant than a quantitative calculation," id. at 570 n.1, but did not
consider the qualitative importance of the selection of the 3,976 facts to plaintiffs work in its
discussion. The court appeared to accept plaintiff's allegation as to the number of facts taken. Id.
at 573 n.6. Under the doctrine of merger, if there is only one way or very few ways to express a
given idea, the idea and expression merge, and there is no protectible expression. See, e.g., Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (stating that where idea
and expression are indistinguishable, expression cannot be protected).
70. Proof of past injury should not, of course, be required in order to obtain an injunction.
In her suggested reform of the test for infringement, Professor Cohen does not require a finding of
harm, but proposes that courts determine fair use as part of the infringement analysis, and in so
doing consider, among the other § 107 factors, whether defendant's use may cause plaintiff
economic injury. Cohen, supra note 2, at 390-94.
David Ladd, a former Register of Copyrights, has written that a requirement of harm as a
condition for giving copyright protection is the "primary doctrinal strain in copyright today." David
Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright: The Thirteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial
Lecture, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 421, 421-22 (1983). This statement is accurate with
respect to the courts' and commentators' general discussion of the purpose of copyright. It is not,
however, an accurate description of the courts' application of the test of substantial similarity.
Former Register Ladd describes the harm doctrine as the view that "copyright should extend no
further than to what is financially indispensable to motivate creation." Id. at 422. In Register
Ladd's opinion, the harm doctrine results in insufficient copyright protection. Id. at 422-25.
The failure to define substantial similarity in terms of the impact of defendant's activities on
plaintiff may be due in some measure to an unspoken assumption that where copyright infringement
has been found, the plaintiff will have suffered some harm. However, even where substantial
similarity is based upon some standard, such as a quantitative standard, see supra note 64 and
accompanying text, there is no reason to believe that findings of substantial similarity and
infringement correlate positively with injury to the plaintiff. Note that the presumption of
irreparable injury for purposes of establishing the right to a preliminary injunction in copyright
infringement cases applies only where likelihood of success on the merits of the infringement claim
has been shown. See, e.g., Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d
91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that where probable success of claim of copyright infringement is
shown, "the allegations of irreparable injury need not be very detailed, because such injury can
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in order for a court to find infringement. First, a finding of harm may
be required by the Copyright Clause, which authorizes Congress to give
authors exclusive rights to their writings: "To promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." 7 The Copyright Clause has been interpreted to mean that
"authors" may be given rights as an incentive to create in order to
promote progress in the realm of "writings." 72 Logic suggests that if
the defendant's actions do the plaintiff no harm, making the defendant
stop will be no benefit to the plaintiff, and there will be no incentive to
create. It may be helpful to break the argument down based on the
primary remedies available under the Copyright Act: injunctions and
monetary damages." An injunction does not benefit the plaintiff if the
defendant's actions cause the plaintiff no harm. If an injunction would
not benefit the plaintiff, then copyright protection offers the plaintiff no
incentive. On the other hand, receiving money is arguably always a
benefit, and therefore awarding money to copyright holders will be an
incentive to creation. However, to the extent that awards of money are
normally be presumed when a copyright is infringed" (emphasis added)).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
72. E.g., Sony Corp of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(copyright monopoly "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors"); 1 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (1991) ("Implicit in this rationale
[i.e., incentive to create] is the assumption that in the absence of such public benefit [i.e., public
benefit from the creative activities of authors] the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals
would be unjustified."). The Framers of the Constitution may or may not have conceived of the
phrase, "To promote the progress of science. . .," as a limitation on the power of Congress. There
is no legislative history dealing with the Framers' consideration of the Copyright Clause. 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra at §§ 1.01, 1.02. The courts have, however, consistently stated that the purpose
of copyright law is to benefit the public by providing an incentive to create, without clarifying
whether the purpose is that of the Framers or that of Congress. E.g., Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("the ultimate aim [of copyright law] is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good"). Commentators have assumed
that the first phrase of the Copyright Clause is a limit on Congress' power. E.g., L. Ray Patterson,
Free Speech, Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 63 (1987). Grammatically, the
Copyright Clause is constructed to empower Congress to promote science; the phrase - "by
securing ... two authors ... the exclusive right . . ." - states the means by which the end is to
be achieved. Thus, based on the grammatical construction of the clause, Congress could not secure
to authors exclusive rights for any purpose other than the promotion of science. See XV THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, vol. 3, 281 (1984) (Roger Sherman, Connecticut delegate
to the Constitutional Convention wrote that powers of Congress include "promoting the-progress of
science in the mode therein pointed out").
73. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504, 505 (1988) (injunctions, damages and profits, costs and attorney's
fees). Impoundment and disposal of infringing items are also available as remedies, 17 U.S.C.
§ 503 (1988), but for the purposes of my argument these remedies do not differ from injunctions.
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made without any injury or harm suffered by the copyright holder, the
awards are a random windfall to the copyright holder.7"
The second argument requires us to consider the impact of our legal
discourse, which has labeled copyright "property." It may be that the
protection of copyright without consideration of harm stems originally
from the judiciary's reverence for copyright as property." There is a
strain of thought that copyright is "private property," and "the owner's
to do with as he pleases, subject to exceptional and quite limited socially
justified uses."'76 The contrasting view is that copyright is a statutorily
created right which is "conditional on and subservient to the public
good."' ' The "private property" perspective leads to protection of
copyright regardless of whether the copyright owner is harmed, and
without regard to the negative impact of such protection on creativity and
the flow of communication.7" However, copyright rules, like other
property rules, should serve rational ends. If the defendant's use does
not harm the plaintiff, what end is served by giving the plaintiff a cause
of action?
Findings of infringement without regard to harm must, then, result
in some over-protection of copyright. One consequence of this over-
74. Theprovisionby Congress of statutory damages, 17 U.S.C. § 504(a), (c) (1988), has been
used to argue that Congress intended that harm not be required in order to establish infringement.
Ladd, supra note 72, at 422 n.2 (availability of statutory damages shows "harm is an untraditional
component of copyright infringement analysis"). The availability of statutory damages, however,
was intended to permit recovery where it is difficult or impossible to reduce the injury suffered by
plaintiff to a dollar amount. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S.
228, 231 (1952) (statutory damages intended to give owner some recompense where proof of
damages or discovery of profits difficult or impossible); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. AlIton Knitting
Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 900, 903 (1981) (statutory damages appropriate in part because actual
damages difficult to ascertain). Further, the liability and remedy phases of a copyright infringement
action are distinct. Not requiring proof of the amount of injury in the second phase does not mean
that a finding of harm cannot be required in the first phase.
75. See Patterson, supra note 72, at 5, 52 ("courts have tended to view copyright as primarily
proprietary in nature;" after 1909 Act courts adopted "notion that copyright was merely property
to be protected as any other property right").
76. LloydL. Weinreb, Fair's Fair; A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1137, 1158 (1990) (characterizing the view of the Second Circuit in the Salinger and New Era
decisions).
77. Id. (characterizing Judge Leval's view in the Salinger and New Era decisions).
78. In the discourse of copyright, the goal of promotion of creativity and the flow of
communication has sometimes been labeled "access." Access has been seen as a policy
consideration in conflict with the major policy behind copyright law, incentive. See, e.g., Computer
Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) (copyright law seeks to establish
"delicate equilibrium" between incentive to create and avoidance of "the effects of monopolistic
stagnation").
Professor Litman has argued that the importance of access has been under-recognized. Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965-69, 977, 1010-12, 1023 (1990).
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protection is the stifling of creativity. Professor Jessica Litman has
eloquently argued that the process of creation is not one of bringing
something "wholly new into the world," but one of expressing the
author's experience of the world, which world includes the works of
other authors.' Creators, therefore, need a body of raw material from
which to draw. This view is supported by those literary critics who have
developed the theory of "intertextuality." ° The critics explain that no
text functions as a closed system because each writer has been exposed
to other works prior to creating. As a result, "the work of art is
inevitably shot through with references, quotations and influences of
every kind."'" That authors must build on prior material is also the
view of Douglas Hofstadter, who has written extensively about creativity
and intelligence. 2 Hofstadter posits that "the crux of creativity resides
in the ability to manufacture variations on a theme."' Variations on
a theme are not trivial or derivative, Hofstadter explains, because "what
we choose to call a new theme is itself always some sort of variation" on
earlier themes. 4
If, then, we are persuaded by those whose specialty is the nature of
the creative process, any over-protection of copyright, besides doing no
good, also does positive harm. To the extent that authors are needlessly
barred from using the works of others, their creative efforts are
discouraged with no countervailing benefit to society.
79. Litman, supra note 78, at 966 ("the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to
translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea"). "An
author, be she writer, composer, or sculptor, seeks to communicate her own expression of the
world. Her views of the world are shaped by her experiences, by the other works of authorship she
has absorbed (which are also her experiences), and by the interaction between the two." Litman,
supra note 78, at 1010. See also Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
4436) (Story, J.) ("No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by
the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a combination of what other
men have thought and expressed. . . ."); Francis M. Nevins, Jr., Availability: The Hidden Value
in Copyright Law, 15 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 285, 286 (1991) ("each of us who creates
something builds on the achievements of our predecessors").
80. See, e.g., MICHAEL WORTON & JUDITH STILL, INTERTEXTUALITY: THEORIES AND
PRACTICES (1990). The term "intertextuality" was coined in the 1960s by Julia Kristeva. Id. at 1-2.
81. Id. at 1. See also Julia Kristeva, Word, Dialogue and Novel, in THE KRISTEVA READER
37 (Toril Moi ed., 1986) ("Any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the
absorption and transformation of another.").
82. See DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID
(1980).
83. DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE ESSENCE OF
MIND AND PATrERN 233, 249 (1985).
84. Id.
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C. Nature of Required Harm
We turn now to the nature of the harm or injury which should be
the measure of substantial similarity. Courts occasionally use economic
injury as a reference point by which to measure substantial similarity, but
even then, rarely explicitly. The opinions merely imply a connection
between economic injury to the plaintiff and substantial similarity.85
The opinion in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc. 86 is a rare example of
an opinion which drew a relatively explicit connection between economic
injury to the plaintiff and substantial similarity. In Dawson, the court
explained that generally, "[t]he lay listener's reaction is relevant because
it gauges the effect of the defendant's work on the plaintiff's market."'
Much more typical is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Atari, Inc. v.
North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp.,8 in which the
court found that the plaintiff was likely to establish the substantial
similarity of the defendant's video game, K.C. Munchkin, to the
plaintiff's game, PAC-MAN. The court merely alluded to the issue of
market impact by stating that video games appeal to an audience that is
undiscriminating regarding subtle differences. 89  The court did not
explicitly state that the relevance of the audience's lack of discrimination
was that less similarity would thus be needed to make consumers select
defendant's game in place of plaintiff's, and thereby reduce plaintiffs
sales.
85. See, e.g., Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enters., 945 F.2d 509,
516 (2d Cir. 1991) ("any consumer faced with the two directories would instantly realize that they
are quite different"); Educational Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 542-43 (3d Cir. 1986)
("qualitative significance" of defendant's actions has been established because plaintiff had to use
new test forms); Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 209-10 (9th Cir. 1988) ("a
discerning 17.5 year old boy," the potential purchaser, could not regard works as substantially
similar); Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987) (because children are
intended market for dolls, court must filter intrinsic inquiry through perception of children). For
use of market impact to determine the scope of the merger doctrine, rather than substantial
similarity, see Computer Assocs., Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
86. 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990).
87. Id. at 734. The Dawson court's focus was on clarifying that improper appropriation should
be determined from the perspective of the audience for a given work, which audience might or might
not be the ordinary lay observer. Id. at 735-36. The court remanded for determination of the
intended audience for an arrangement of a spiritual. Id. at 738.
88. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 619. The leading case for the proposition that improper appropriation should be
determined from the perspective of the work's audience, Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.
1946), similarly alluded to market impact without making the connection explicit. The court stated
that "[tihe question, therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiff's works so much of what
is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is
composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." Id.
at 473.
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We have seen, then, that courts generally determine substantial
similarity without reference to degree of injury suffered by the plaintiff,
economic or otherwise. As discussed above, a few cases allude to
economic injury as a reference point to give substantial similarity
meaning. This leads us to consider whether the nature of the injury
justifying a copyright cause of action need be economic.
To the extent that courts have explicitly considered the nature of the
incentive which copyright law is intended to offer creators, that incentive
has certainly been conceived of as economic.' However, in
determining the issue of infringement, courts do occasionally find
liability where there is no plausible economic injury, but some other
form of harm is apparent. The Second Circuit decisions in Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.91 and Salinger v. Random
House, Inc.' are notable cases in point. The Gilliam court's
recognition of infringement in editing a television program beyond the
scope of a license, was based on the desire to protect the plaintiffs not
from economic loss, but from loss of artistic control." In Salinger the
Second Circuit assumed infringement of J.D. Salinger's letters although
economic injury was improbable, apparently because of Salinger's desire
90. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind
the [Copyright Clause] is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors.. . ."); Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) ("The plaintiff's legally protected interest is not, as such, his
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions
.... "). Economic analysis of copyright law has primarily treated the incentive to produce works
as monetary. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989). "Since the decision to create the work must
be made before the demand for copies is known, the work will be created only if the difference
between expected revenues and the cost of making copies equals or exceeds the cost of expression."
Id.
91. 538F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
92. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
93. See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 21.
Whether intended to allow greater economic exploitation of the work, as in the media and
time cases, or to ensure that the copyright proprietor retains a veto power over revisions
desired for the derivative work [as in this case], the ability of the copyright holder to
control his work remains paramount in our copyright law.
Id. The Gilliam court based its decision on two alternative theories: copyright infringement and
unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). Gilliam, 538
F.2d at 18-25. In Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980)
the court also protected the plaintiff's artistic control, rather than an economic interest. The court
found infringement where defendant added advertisements to the work of an author who had never
endorsed any specific product, in order to give her "control over the context and manner in which
... her work is presented." Id. at 543-44.
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for privacy.' Thus, courts have, at least occasionally, been moved by
non-economic harm to find infringement.
Does the Constitution require that an economic injury underlie a
copyright cause of action? As the Copyright Clause has been interpreted
to authorize Congress to offer rights as an incentive to produce
copyrightable works, 9' the question is whether the Constitution requires
that that incentive be economic. The Copyright Clause itself does not
clarify the nature of the benefits to authors of exclusive rights in their
writings.' As a practical matter, an author may enjoy exclusivity for
a variety of reasons, only one of which, or even none of which, may be
economic.' Therefore, might not an author be encouraged to create by
the promise of the non-economic benefits of exclusive rights in her
works?
Turning to the broader field of tort law as a whole, of which
copyright law is a part, albeit a statutory and federal part, we see that
compensation of purely non-economic, non-monetary injuries is not
unheard of. Our legal system does not appear to be incapable of
94. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92, 95, 99. As is not uncommon in cases in which the defense of
fair use is an issue, the court in Salinger discussed the issues of ownership and fair use and omitted
any discussion of infringement. Id. at 94-95. For further discussion see supra Part IV. Chief
Judge Oakes of the Second Circuit has written elsewhere that "Salinger is a decision which, even
if rightly decided on its facts, involved underlying, if latent, privacy implications.. . ." New Era
Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C.J.,
concurring). Judge Leval of the Southern District of New York had found that the marketability of
Salinger's letters was unimpaired. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413, 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). Even the Second Circuit in its fair use discussion showed some ambivalence
concerning economic harm: "To be sure, the book would not displace the market for the letters.
Indeed, we think it likely that most of the potential purchasers of a collection of the letters would
not be dissuaded by publication of the biography. Yet some impairment of the market seems
likely." Salinger, 811 F.2d at 99.
95. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
96. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
97. See, e.g., Michael F. Sitzer, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for
Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 385, 392 n.36
(1981).
One might argue that the gains derived from the granting of a copyright are not purely
monetary, but that copyright protection encompasses certain noneconomic or "moral"
rights as well. For instance, the desire of a novelist to have a novel credited to his or
her name may provide part, or even all, of the incentive to write this novel.
Id. Congress recognized in adopting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, PUB. L. No. 101-650,
104 STAT. 5128 (1990), that non-financial benefits may provide incentive to create. See H.R. REP.
No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915. "'The
theory of moral rights is that they result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the
author in the arduous act of creation.'" Id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 2690 Before the
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Committte on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights)).
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compensating non-economic harm, and has recognized such injuries in
a variety of contexts. For example, one may recover for invasion of
privacy, although no physical or economic injury was suffered. 98
Similarly, intentional infliction of emotional distress has been recognized
as a cause of action, in spite of the absence of any harm other than
mental suffering. 99 Concerns that intangible injuries unaccompanied by
any physical component would be too difficult to prove and would
therefore lead to fraudulent claims were dismissed as courts recognized
as independent torts invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress."°  In the copyright context, the degree of non-
tangible, non-economic harm will have to be proven in order to establish
infringement, but this determination is as much within the competence
of courts as are determinations of degree of emotional distress or degree
of unpleasantness occasioned by an alleged invasion of privacy. Within
the Copyright Act itself, remedies have recently been provided in section
106A for acts injurious to the reputation of the creators of a limited class
of works of visual art.'"' An artist need show no economic harm in
order to recover for a violation of section 106A.102 There appears,
98. See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (where defendant
revealed to husband private letters of wife, husband and wife can recover although only injury is
mental anguish; "privacy tort's purpose is 'primarily to recover for a hurt to the feelings of the
individual'"); Harris v. Easton Publishing Co., 483 A.2d 1377 (Pa. Super. 1984) (cause of action
for invasion of privacy stated where defendant published in newspaper facts concerning applicant
for welfare). "The fact that the plaintiff suffered neither pecuniary loss nor physical harm is
unimportant." Harris, 483 A.2d at 1385 (quoting Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 426 (Pa.
Super. 1959)); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, TORTS § 117, at 849-869 (5th ed. 1984).
99. See, e.g., Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 346 (Utah 1961) (cause of action for intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress stated where defendant allegedly repeatedly solicited illicit
sexual relations with plaintiff; "the best considered view recognizes an action for severe emotional
distress, though not accompanied by bodily impact or physical injury"); Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d
431 (Vt. 1978) (cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress stated where defendant
allegedly prevented all communication between plaintiff and her daughter); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra, note 98 at § 12, at 57, 64 ("the infliction of mental injury may be a cause of action in itself';
numerous decisions "have found liability for mere mental disturbances without any evidence of
physical consequences").
100. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 72 (Ga. 1905) ("[T]here
need be no more fear that the right of privacy will be the occasion of unjustifiable litigation,
oppression, or wrong than that the existence of many other rights in the law would bring about such
results."); Sanmms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (Utah 1961) ("That some claims [for intentional
infliction of severe emotional distress] may be spurious should not compel those who administer
justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let them go without being brought to account.").
101. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 11 1990) (codifying in part Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,
PUB. L. NO. 101-650, 104 STAT. 5128); H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915 (the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 protects the
reputations of certain visual artists).
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (author of work of visual art has right to claim authorship, to
prevent the use of her name as the author under certain circumstances, to prevent modification or
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then, to be no fundamental theoretical impediment to providing remedies
for non-economic harm.
Therefore, the approach advocated here for determinations of
substantial similarity is to consider any injury that may have an impact
on authors' incentive to create, including: economic harm, harm to
reputation, loss of privacy, and loss of artistic control.'°3 Whether two
works are substantially similar should be decided by asking whether the
similarities are such as to result in substantial harm to the plaintiff of one
of the sorts listed above. A not insignificant advantage of this approach
is that if judicial opinions explicitly set forth courts' harm-based
analyses, prediction of litigation outcomes will be more accurate and
parties will be able to order their conduct accordingly. "
Another benefit of the harm-based analysis advcoated here is that
infringement will be found less frequently than is currently the case, thus
taking some pressure off the much over-worked fair use doctrine.
Because courts are finding infringement where they should not, fair use
is being pressed into service in contexts far beyond its intended
scope."' For example, if it is true, as the Supreme Court concluded
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., °6 that the
owners of copyright in the audiovisual works there at issue suffer no
substantial market injury due to time-shifting,"°7 then, under the
approach recommended here, no infringement could be found, obviating
destruction of work under certain circumstances); 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. 11 1990) (copyright
remedies available for violation of rights conferred by § 106A(a)).
103. Regardingprivacy interests, Professor Nimmer has pointed out that copyright law has long
recognized these interests "by granting to authors a right of first publication as a central component
of copyright." Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186-87 (1970).
It should be noted that the proposal made here regarding the issue of liability does not require
any change in the remedies available for copyright infringement. The provisions for statutory
damages or recovery of defendant's profits provide adequate relief for infringement where no actual
monetary loss can be proven by plaintiff. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1988).
104. For the lack of predictability of outcomes in infringement actions, see Ideal Toy Corp. v.
Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Test for infringement of a copyright is of
necessity vague . . . [and] decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc") (quoting Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)); Educational Testing
Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 1986) ("A finding of substantial similarity is an ad
hoc determination."); Gastineau, supra note 2, at 119-120; Wurzer, supra note 2, at 1521; Cohen,
supra note 2, at 350.
105. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-74 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678-88. The legislative history of § 107 stresses uses for criticism, news
reporting, education and scholarship. See id.
106. 464U.S. 417 (1984).
107. Id. at 454-55. The court noted the district court's finding that harm from time-shifting was
minimal and concluded that the record "amply supportted]" a finding of fair use. Id. No harm
other than market injury arguably resulted from time-shifting in Sony. See id. at 453-55.
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the need to consider the fair use defense. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
recently found that copying a computer program in order to study its
unprotectible elements was fair use. 08 Under the proposed approach,
the defendant's act could not constitute infringement because no harm
was thereby done to the plaintiff. Any argument that the plaintiff was
harmed because the defendant could now compete with the plaintiff is not
a basis for copyright infringement, since the plaintiff is harmed not, for
example, by defendant's copying and selling plaintiffs program, but by
defendant's knowing how plaintiff's program works. Once again, if the
court had not found infringement, there would have been no need to
resort to fair use.
To the very limited extent that courts have considered injury in
determining substantial similarity, economic injury may have been
preferred due to its apparent objectivity, but that objectivity is spurious.
In all cases, the only basis for asserting that a given injury is sufficient
to support an infringement action and indeed, that it is an injury, is that
we think that the conduct is something a creator should not have to
endure. Consider the argument that the plaintiff copyright owner has
suffered an economic injury where the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
work is not in direct competition with that work. Here the argument that
the plaintiff has lost the license fee that plaintiff could have charged
defendant for permission to use the work, if defendant had not done so
without permission, has an obvious circularity."° The plaintiff could
have extracted a license fee only if the defendant could not use the
108. SegaEnters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992).
[D]isassembly of copyrighted object code is, as a matter of law, a fair use of the
copyrighted work if such disassembly provides the only means of access to those
elements of the code that are not protected by copyright and the copier has a legitimate
reason for seeking such access.
Id. Disassembly is the process of translating object code, written in two symbols, 0 and 1, into
human-readable source code. Id. at 1515 n.2. The court recognized Accolade's desire to create
video game programs that would be compatible with Sega's game console as a legitimate reason for
disassembly. Id. at 1522-23.
109. Courts not infrequently use lost license fees as a measure of damages once infringement
has been found. E.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992) (in this case "a
reasonable license fee for the use of [plaintiff's photograph] best approximates the market injury
sustained by [plaintiff] as a result of [defendant's] misappropriation"); Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos.
Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff entitled to recover value of
license fee as damages); Kleier Advertising, Inc. v. Premier Pontiac, Inc., 921 F.2d 1036, 1040
(10th Cir. 1990) (affirming jury award of amount of lost license fee as actual damages). These
decisions, however, are not relevant to the issue of infringement. The determination of liability
represents the decision that defendant cannot do whatever it did without permission. Once it has
been established that the defendant cannot act without permission, the cost of that permission is an
appropriate measure of what plaintiff lost when permission was not obtained. Discussions of the
measure of damages presuppose but do not deal with the issue of liability.
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plaintiffs work without permission, which is what we are trying to
determine in the first instance.
In a case where the defendant's use of the plaintiff's work competes
directly, as where defendant copies for sale portions of plaintiffs book,
which plaintiff also is selling, it is perhaps harder to see the circularity
of the argument that plaintiff has thereby lost sales which plaintiff could
otherwise have made. However, we can only know that plaintiff and
only plaintiff would have made those other sales if plaintiff had the
exclusive right to make the sales, which once again is the question being
determined. Similarly, to say, for example, that the plaintiff has suffered
a loss of privacy as a result of an act of copying, is to presuppose that
plaintiff had the power to keep the work secret, which once again is the
question before us. In each case there is no objective loss; in each case
we must decide what kind of conduct constitutes harm.'
The vigilant reader will have noticed that in the preceding discussion
the author shifted the modifier "substantial" from the word "similarity"
to the word "harm." This placement of the term "substantial" makes
clear that the level of harm, whether economic, loss of privacy, harm to
reputation or loss of artistic control, should be high in order to support
a copyright infringement action. For example, due to his relentless self-
promotion, L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology,
should not be able to establish infringement of portions of his
unpublished letters and diaries, copied by a critical biographer, on
grounds of loss of privacy."' Similarly, infringement should not be
110. Note that in this respect a copyright does not differ from tangible property, either personal
or real. Where, for example, defendant has used plaintiff's land, the conclusion that plaintiff has
thereby been injured presupposes that plaintiff had the right to prevent defendant from using her
land. The view expressed here is contrary to the belief that property rights are natural rights. See,
e.g., Harbor View Improvement Assoc. v. Downey, 311 A.2d 422,425, 428 (Md. 1973) (affirming
unenforceability of restrictive covenant; "restrictions upon the use of land are in derogation of the
natural right which an owner possesses to use and enjoy his property"); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS 6, 85, 230-31 (1985) ("trespass is not wrong because the state prohibits it; it is wrong
because individuals own private property"; "the rules of property uniquely specify the rights of all
persons for all times"; "there is some natural and unique set of entitlements that are protected under
a system of private property"). Contra Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U.
MiAMI L. REV. 21, 29-34 (1986); Mark Kelman, Taking "Takings" Seriously: An Essay for
Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1829, 1833-36 (1986). Note that there are other scholars who use the
term "natural rights" in a sense fundamentally different from that described above. For example,
Professor Malloy employs the term "natural rights" as a form of discourse in order to assert that
"there are limits to the acceptable exercise of collective (group) or state power (coercion) against
the individual." Robin Paul Malloy, Toward a New Discourse of Law and Economics, 42 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 27, 58 (1991).
111. See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 578-80 (2d Cir.
1989). The actual plaintiff in the case, the corporation which held the copyright in certain Hubbard
works, would not be able to establish infringement based on loss of privacy because the corporation
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based on loss of artistic control where the defendant has purchased prints
and books lawfully reproducing the plaintiff's works of art and has glued
each print or page to a ceramic tile. "2 In such a case, no change was
made in plaintiff's works other than the framing device. While
protection of the copyright owner from negligible harm offers little or no
incentive to create, such protection affirmatively impoverishes our
cultural interchange by diminishing the tools of communication available
to later creators.
1 3
In many cases where the defendant has produced a derivative work
based on the plaintiff's work, the most appropriate basis for determining.
substantial similarity and consequent infringement may be loss of artistic
control or harm to reputation. Consider 2 Live Crew's rap version of
the 1960's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," which version the copyright
owner refused to license." 4 Here economic injury was tenuous, while
the true gravamen appeared to be the lack of control over the form in
which the original song appeared before the public." 5 By the same
token, the injury to the owner of the copyright in Superman and
Wonderwoman caused by singing telegram skits featuring Super Stud and
Wonder Wench was primarily harm to reputation, rather than economic
loss."16
had no privacy interest. See id. at 577, 588 n.4 (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (stating that privacy
concerns are not implicated where author was a "public figure" and is dead). The Second Circuit
did not address the issue of infringement, dealing exclusively with fair use. Id. at 582-84.
112. See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1135 (1989). In Mirage the court did not consider loss of artistic control
or harm to the plaintiffs, nor did the court discuss substantial similarity. See id. The court found
that defendant's mounting of lawfully obtained reproductions of plaintiffs' works on ceramic tiles
constituted preparation of derivative works and was therefore infringement. Id. at 1343.
113. See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
114. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1432 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 1642 (1993). The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to defendants. Id. at 1431.
115. The rap song was unlikely to compete directly with the original "Oh, Pretty Woman," and
plaintiff, having refused to license defendant's use, could not claim the loss of that licensing fee.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1158 (M.D. Tenn. 1991) ("it is extremely
unlikely that 2 Live Crew's song could adversely affect the market for the original" because
"intended audience for the two songs is entirely different"); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d at
1432 (plaintiff refused to license defendant). The Sixth Circuit limited its discussion of infringement
to citation to section 106(1) and 106(2) and the statement that plaintiff's song was "subject to these
protections." See id. at 1434. The court's comments raise but do not resolve the question of
infringement. The court focused on its rejection of the fair use defense based primarily on the
commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's use. Id. at 1439 ("It is the blatantly commercial purpose of
the derivative work that prevents this parody from being a fair use. "). At the time of writing of this
Article, the Supreme Court is expected to render its opinion in Acuff-Rose shortly.
116. See DC Comics, Inc., v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D.Ga.
1984). The court's finding of substantial similarity was based on the extent of copying, but the
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The objection may be made that by explicitly recognizing loss of
artistic control and harm to reputation as bases for finding substantial
similarity and therefore infringement, we would extend protection of a
sort usually labeled moral rights." 7 Such an objection lacks substance.
First, the fact that protection might be labeled moral rights is not in itself
a reason for failing to grant such protection within the Copyright Act.
Second, copyright has on occasion been used by the courts to give just
such protection."' Further, the United States has promised by
accession to the Berne Convention to grant moral rights protection,"9
and Congress indicated in the legislative history of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act that Congress intended that the Copyright Act, along
with other federal and state laws, supply the moral rights protection
needed to satisfy our commitments under the Berne Convention. 2
More recently, Congress has recognized the appropriateness of extending
moral rights protection through the Copyright Act by legislating in
Section 106A certain aspects of moral rights protection for certain limited
classes of visual art.
121
VI. Conclusion
In copyright infringement cases, the determination of substantial
similarity to establish improper appropriation is generally performed
court's discussion of fair use showed concern that defendant's work "tarnishes the 'all-American'
image" of Superman and Wonder Woman. Id. at 117, 118.
117. Moral rights are generally defined as the right of paternity (the right to accurate attribution
of works), the right of integrity (the right to be free from prejudicial modification of works), and
the right to control publication of works. See, e.g., Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the
Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 480-81 (1968).
118. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
119. The United States acceded to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works (hereinafter "the Berne Convention") effective March 1, 1989. Dep't of State
Notice, 53 Fed. Reg. 48,748 (1988) (announcing that the United States deposited its instrument of
accession to the Berne Convention on Nov. 16, 1988, with the Director General of the World
Intellectual Property Organization). The Berne Convention requires that member countries grant
authors the right of paternity and the right of integrity. Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971, and amended 1979, art. 6bis,
S. TREATY DOC. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 235 (1972).
120. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3706, 3714-15 (stating that protection of paternity and integrity rights required by Berne Convention
is provided by existing law, including Copyright Act, Lanham Act, state statutes, and common law
doctrine).
121. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, PUB. L. 101-650, 104 STAT. 5128 (codified in part at
17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 11 1990)). "These rights [limited rights of paternity and integrity in
certain works of visual art granted by the act] are analogous to those protected by Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention, which are commonly known as 'moral rights'." H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6915.
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without any real-life referent to give the term meaning. Decision of
copyright infringement cases without regard to the effect of the
defendant's conduct on the plaintiff results in over-protection of
copyright, which restricts further creative efforts and the flow of
communication.
Although the early development of the standard for improper
appropriation indicated that such appropriation involved taking something
of value, plaintiffs have not been required to prove injury. It is here
proposed that, given a finding of actual copying, substantial similarity be
determined by asking whether existing similarities are such as to result
in substantial harm to the plaintiff, including economic harm, harm to
reputation, loss of privacy, and loss of artistic control.

